基于内生信息的初始排污权拍卖机制研究Study on the Auction of Initial Emission Tradable Permits Based on the Endogenous Information Structure
颜伟;唐德善;
摘要(Abstract)：
该研究放松了信息外生给定的假设,认为信息可以内生获取。基于Compte模型构建了不同区域排污权初始分配的动态拍卖模型,模型结果显示,动态拍卖机制比静态拍卖机制更能促使排污企业搜集信息,并使政府部门获取更多收益。
关键词(KeyWords)： 排污权;拍卖;内生信息
基金项目(Foundation):
作者(Author): 颜伟;唐德善;
Email:
DOI: 10.13989/j.cnki.0517-6611.2008.06.158
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